

Crossing ideological borders: How to contribute to depolarization within society and on a global level?

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Abstract

Polarization is a global issue with many different faces on regional levels. However, the process is the same everywhere. Research has extensively proved that media and journalism play an important role in the development of polarization. This paper presents an overview of the process of polarization and seeks to clarify the role of media and Journalism therein. On the basis of the model of Bart Brandsma, a Dutch polarization expert, the mechanism of polarization will be explained, identifying three ground rules that govern a situation of polarization, five roles or actors which can be identified in a polarization process, and four game changers that can help revert its destructive impact. The context of the paper is the *journalistic practice* and, specifically, the search for innovation of the profession towards a more constructive application. The aim is to further the development of a journalistic professionalism which seeks to depolarize, rather than add to polarization.

Keywords

Polarization, conflict, identity, journalistic profession, constructive journalism

A brief research overview

Polarization is a trending topic. Ample research has been done on, specifically, political polarization and the role media plays in it. In a paper presented at the conference of the International Communication Association, San Diego (May 2017), Rachid Azrout and Magdalena Wojcieszak identify two important aspects which, up until recently, have not yet received sufficient attention: one pertaining

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to *scope*, the other to *method*. As to the former: most studies focus on the US. The particular socio-political situation there, with a two-party political system and a strong partisan press, does not, however, apply to many other places in the world. Most Western democracies, for instance, know multiparty political systems, and it is imperative that effects of media on polarization in these contexts also be assessed. New strategies for studying these effects need to be developed, and Azrout and Wojcieszak attempt at providing such a strategy, “offering causal and generalizable evidence in a non-US context” (Azrout & Wojcieszak, 2017b).

As to the latter: Azrout and Wojcieszak state that “the observational work on media effects on polarization rarely attends to actual media content..., and the experimental designs that shows which specific messages exert effects are limited in terms of external validity” (Azrout & Wojcieszak, 2017b). In their own research they seek to remedy these shortcomings by “theoretically and empirically differentiat[ing] between two factors that may drive polarization: mere exposure to media coverage and the tone of the coverage that an individual sees in the outlets s/he habitually uses” (Azrout & Wojcieszak, 2017a).

In attempting to fill the gaps of the empirical research done so far on the topic of (political) polarization and media, Azrout and Wojcieszak provide ample overview of that research.

The focus of the paper I present here, however, is not based on empirical research, but rather presents a model that explains the dynamics of polarization and aims at developing journalistic *practice*. The model is originally developed by Dutch philosopher Bart Brandsma, evolving from his experiences of many years as a trainer/consultant in situations of conflict in, for instance, Northern-Ireland, the Lebanon, Congo and Serbia. Brandsma bases his model on the work of the French historian, literary critic and philosopher, René Girard, whose theory of *mimetic desire*, *mimetic rivalry* and the *scapegoat mechanism* are fundamental for the concepts of ‘conflict’ and ‘human nature’. Another fundamental influence has been dialogue trainer Colin Craig and his dialogue training program Dialogue for Peaceful Change (DPC).

Brandsma uses his polarization model in training sessions, nationally and internationally, with mayors, prosecutors, executives, police, caregivers and journalists. His theory has, thus, been field-tested, yet awaits further scientific validation.

At Windesheim University of Applied Science (Netherlands) this polarization model is being taught to students of journalism by the author of this article in the context of Constructive Journalism. Pioneered by Danish journalist Cathrine

Gyldensted, Constructive Journalism aims at innovating journalistic practice by applying the insights of positive and moral psychology and behavioural science (Gyldensted, 2015).

Polarization as a notion

Polarization may be popular and trending as a topic, as a social phenomenon it is, however, neither new nor recent. Polarization, in general, a sharp division between people or opinions, is of all times and all places; rich and poor, high descent or low descent, conquerors and conquered. In a way it is part of the human condition. It takes place on a global scale and on regional or local levels; everyone will be able to give examples from his or her own daily environment. From my own personal history, I can say I grew up in the polarization context of the so-called 'Cold War'. Born in The Netherlands, I was taught we were the Free West and opposite was the Unfree East, stuck behind an 'Iron Curtain'. We did not concern ourselves too much with the image that existed of us on the other side. We sang along with British popstar Sting (Sting, 1985, track 3): "*Believe me when I say to you, I hope the Russians love their children too.*" I guess the people in the East had the same attitude towards us in the West. I do not know what songs *they* sang.

There is a strong connection between polarization and media. Maybe it is even safe to say that there can be no polarization without some form of media involved, be it the travelling theatre company in the Medieval market square or the Gutenberg printing press in the fifteenth century that served as the medium for new ideas and revolutionary tidings. In that respect there have been recent changes and transitions in the media that have given rise to polarization being a topic of particular importance and urgency. In historic times of Medieval market places and printed versions of revolutionary ideas transported in saddle bags, news travelled slowly from town to town. Being told and retold, written and rewritten, news could be filtered and adjusted to the new cultural surroundings it landed in, making it possible for people to digest what new tidings had come to them. Globalization and digitalization in the field of media have changed the speed and the reach of news immensely in the last decades. The news of people and opinions standing in strong opposition towards each other travels faster and further than ever before. We can see it *live*, unfiltered. The question is whether journalists and other media professionals are sufficiently aware of the impact that has on the people consuming that news. Dutch journalist, Joris Luyendijk, gives an example of that impact, as he analyses his work as a correspondent to the Middle-East during the Second Intifada. Being confronted with casualties of the uprising on both Palestinian and Israeli sides, Luyendijk noticed the

impact the images of the burial scenes had on the Dutch (Western) viewers. The burials that were shown of the Jewish Israeli casualties were conducted in a relatively (considering the media attention) quiet and orderly fashion, in a sense compatible to what the Dutch viewers were used to in their own context. The burials shown of the Palestinian casualties, however, appeared loud and chaotic; dense crowds passing on dead bodies over their heads, shouting and crying. To many Dutch (Western) viewers, these overt emotional scenes seemed uncanny and disrespectful. Luyendijk points out the dilemma of the journalist: even *live* transmissions sometimes fail to connect human beings in shared life experiences like death and grief (Luyendijk, 2007). At times, cultural codes get in the way of mutual understanding and, more often than not, news reporting intensifies the division between people and so furthers polarization. In order to substantiate the claim that polarization as a social phenomenon is strongly connected to media and to better understand what, then, the role is that media plays in polarization, we need to analyze the process of polarization. I will do so using the model constructed by Dutch polarization expert Bart Brandsma (2016) and embedding it, for the sake of illustration, in a situation of polarization from recent history. In addition, I would like to give food for thought on how to arrive at a depolarizing and, therefore, more constructive role for media to play.

Rwanda

On April 6, 1994 the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down on approaching Kigali airport. Both Heads of State died that night. It was the onset of the genocide in Rwanda; 100 days of brutal killing that resulted in 800.000 of the Tutsi minority slaughtered by the Hutu majority. This bare statistic left many a news consumer outside of that region, like myself, baffled and shaking their heads in disbelief: ‘what is *wrong* with these people? What is wrong with that *continent*?’. As always when such frustrations are outed, things are more complicated than that.

The genocide in Rwanda was the violent outburst of the discontent, aversion and hatred that had been festering for a long time in Rwandan society. In its development this particular tragedy is exemplary of the process of polarization. It shows how ongoing and unchecked polarization can result in situations of atrocity and, even, civil war or genocide.

Three basic laws

The process of polarization is governed by three basic laws. The first law is that polarization is based on a thought-construct, with at its core two constructed

opposing identities: a ‘we’ and a ‘they’. Around that core are all those elements that contribute to constructing this ‘we’ and this ‘they’; attributions with which the other side is described (‘they’ are stern, not free, greedy, fanatical, uneducated, backwards, plainly *different!*), suggestive words and phrases (‘streams of immigration’, ‘islamization’, ‘immigrants are luck-seekers, profiteers’), thoughts, images, emotions. Take for instance the polarization that existed during the so-called Cold War between the West and the East. From both sides the identity of the opposing side was being constructed, using theories, words, phrases, images, and emotions. It served as a popular theme in songs and movies. Currently, we see polarization existing between, for example, the culture of the so-called Free West over against that of the so-called Islamic World, with as its most outspoken representative, at least in the opinion of many Western non-Muslims, Daesh or IS. That for many Muslims Daesh or IS is not at all the pinnacle representative of Islam in general is often overlooked. But in many, particularly Western-European, countries, this polarization is also seen on a national scale, with a rise in nationalistic or extreme-right movements positioning themselves over against immigrants of particularly Muslim background.

The second law is that polarization needs fuel. The thought construct of what ‘they’ are like over against the way ‘we’ are needs to be reaffirmed continuously. If this does not happen, polarization does not enfold. It is here, in particular, that we see the role of media and journalism coming to the fore. In the complexity of today’s world, journalists often choose the frame of conflict for their reporting; putting people of two opposite opinions at the table of a talk show or in front of the camera creates a clear-cut image of a situation, which in reality often is much more complicated than portrayed. This way, the adversarial principle appears to be adhered to and, in that, an important journalistic demand to have been met. Whether this accurately reflects the actual situation might be a different matter entirely.

Dutch media professionals Zoë Papaikonomou en Annebregt Dijkman, both with extensive experience in the area of cultural and religious diversity in media and the media profession, give graphic examples of how themes and topics entailing aspects of religious and cultural diversity (especially concerning the place of Islam in Dutch society) are being approached by Dutch journalists. Often lacking the right contacts (meaning: people of another cultural and/or religious background than their own) in their own network, they ask their colleagues with a non-Western and/or Muslim background whether they “... have an angry muslim” for them to interview to counterbalance either a Dutch anti-Islam politician or a well-integrated fellow Muslim (Papaikonomou & Dijkman, 2018). These journalists apparently feel the need (or are assigned

by their editors) to show dichotomy and division. The people featuring in these stories, therefore, have to be angry, different and religious enough to counter standard, 'normal' Dutch society. But, in truth, how *real* is this portrayal?

The third law is that polarization is driven by emotion, not rationality or logic. It is an emotional dynamic. That means that once the process that divides people into two opposing factions is in motion, it can hardly be checked or stopped by reasonable argumentation or even contrary facts. Many people will simply not be susceptible anymore to logic and reason once their emotions have been aroused and set in one direction of thought.

Going back to the case study of the Rwandan genocide, we can see the laws at work. Two clearly defined groups stood in opposition: the Hutu's and the Tutsi's. At the height of the polarization the identity of the Tutsi's was reduced by the Hutu's to one image: they are cockroaches to be exterminated (Brummel, 2004). Fact is, however, that during the preceding decades, either group had been oppressive towards the other. The genocide of 1994 was the result of years of oppression and stigmatizing of the Hutu population. It had produced hatred and frustration and led to this violent outburst. Having said that, if we look at history and observe the development of the tense relationship between Hutu's and Tutsi's more rationally, we find that the divide between them was largely created during the 19th and early 20th centuries by the European colonial powers. In pre-colonial times, the lines between Hutu's and Tutsi's were fluid and intertwined; the names merely indicating a class distinction, not a racial or ethnic one (Hutu's were peasants, Tutsi's were cattle owners). The colonial regime forged it into an ethnic distinction, using 19th century 'scientifically' underpinned racial theories. In addition, the colonial regime favored one of the two groups: the wealthier class of the cattle owning Tutsi's. In the 1930's, every citizen of Rwanda had to carry an identity card, indicating the carrier as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. So, during colonial times the identities needed for polarization were forged, the fire of division was stoked by favoring one group over the other and the stage was set for an emotional build-up where every incident, large or small, produced fuel for conflict (Brummel, 2004).

The notion that knowledge of the history and culture of Rwanda and its population was not only lacking in international politics, but also in the international media, is shown in *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (Thompson, A. et al., 2007). This lack resulted in the tragedy that was taking place being interpreted and reported, certainly in its early stages, as another outburst of irrational African tribalism (Melvern, L., 2007). Journalists on site and editors abroad are described as mistaking the situation as 'merely chaotic', instead of what it really was: planned genocide. Former BBC world affairs correspondent Mark Doyle: "There is a general

tendency to portray Africa as chaotic, the Dark Continent, and so on [...]. But Rwanda was not, after a while, chaotic or impenetrable. It was, as we now know, a very well planned political and ethnic genocide. That didn't really fit the media image of chaotic Africa and various things flowed from that" (Doyle, M., 2007). The contributions of the various journalists and authors give testimony to the failing role of the media (a clear distinction is made between the media that failed and the individual, committed journalists that didn't [Chaon, A., 2007]) that could and should have made the difference. Self-examination, certainly of Western media, shows a polarization at work, where the identities in opposition are the 'Western enlightened minds' and the 'backward African tribalists'. Reporting from this perspective of supremacy has made it possible to overlook a genocide in process for several weeks. Crucial weeks that cost many lives.

The five roles

In the polarization process, next to the three basic laws, five roles are identified (Brandsma, 2016):

1. On either pole we meet the **pusher**. The pusher makes statements about the identity of the other pole. In the Rwandan case, the statement regarding the Tutsi's being cockroaches indicated clearly that a dangerous line had been crossed. Certainly the Western-European observer could and should have been alarmed by the clear association with the extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War. (That tragedy also became overt by the identification of Jews as rats and vermin.) No doubt, all of us have encountered polarizing statements, be it of a less extreme nature, about 'the other', like: 'they are uneducated, they are greedy, stern, backwards.' Polarizing identity-constructs like: East-West, religious-secularist, Islamic world-Western world are further 'enhanced' in stigma's like: 'they are fascists, they are communists, they are extremists, they are terrorists, they are godless.' Who hasn't heard (or even made) remarks like: 'they take our jobs, our wives, our security; they take advantage'? The message of any pusher in any polarization always is: they are *not like us!* The pusher is the exponent of the pole: He takes the spotlight and shows himself at all times to be 100% in the right. This visibility is often quite demanding on the part of the pusher. Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, for example, a strong polarizer with an anti-Islam standpoint, needs to take security precautions wherever he goes. The pusher creates a sense of urgency and pressure in the public domain. He is not interested in dialogue or achieving mutual understanding. Quite to the contrary: his position depends on the 'over-against'.

2. The second role is that of **joiner**. The joiner chooses sides in the polarization process and, in doing so, steps out of the pressure zone. He may do

this cautiously or even reluctantly, but he *does* choose. He is the one who may say casually and often in informal settings like a birthday party or a night among friends in the pub: ‘well, this Geert Wilders, he’s too extreme for my liking with his Islam bashing, but somewhere he does have a point. And let’s be honest: he is the one who dares to take a stand.’ Joiners are willing to enter the discussion and bring the arguments the pusher often lacks. Consciously of their role or not, the joiners are the foot soldiers of the pushers.

3. Between the spheres of the joiners on both sides exists a middle ground, and it is here that we find the third role: that of the **silent**. The silent are those people who do not choose sides. They cannot or do not want to choose, either out of indifference or as a matter of principle. In this middle ground we also find the people who need to stay neutral because of their function: the mayors, the policemen, the civil servants, the clergy, the judiciaries. All those who comprise the group of the silent resist the pressure of the pushers and their joiners. In all their different motivations for being in the middle, they have one thing in common: *invisibility*. Most of them (apart from the officials) do not appear in talk shows, are not being interviewed by journalists. One can draw a line showing the increasing visibility of the roles involved in polarization. Therein, media coverage is an important indicator. The silent are a diverse group; they offer a diversity of stories. As a journalist, how do you find good stories in this amalgamate? Most journalists focus on the easily identified counter groups of the pushers and the joiners. The middle group of the silent has long gone unnoticed or has been seen as uninteresting by the media. But it is important to consider that the middle group, the silent, is the media’s public. They are the news consumers, the clients. They make up society.

The three roles of the pushers, joiners and the silent create the field of tension that polarization feeds on.

4. The fourth role is that of someone wanting to rise above the opposing parties in order to relax the tension. He is the **bridge builder** who wants to bring the parties back together. We see initiatives on every level of society - from local interreligious dialogue groups to international peace conferences. The strategies of bridge building vary, but the core is found in producing the counter-narrative to the message of the pusher. When Geert Wilders says Islam is incompatible to Dutch society, the bridge builder will want to show the opposite: Muslims partaking in Dutch society. In Rwanda, when Hutu pushers shouted that Tutsi’s are cockroaches, the bridge builders may have stressed that Tutsi’s had been neighbors and friends for many years (George, T. 2004). Although the motivation of the bridge builder is to secure peace and establish harmony, his action only affirms polarization; the starting point of

dialogue *still* being the difference between the poles and the topic of discussion *still* being identity. However, much is stressed that the identity of the other is OK too, it is *still* a 'different one from ours' and, therefore, by definition suspect.

5. The last role, the **scapegoat**, comes into play when polarization culminates in excess. When that happens, the pushers tend to move to (yet more) extreme positions, and so do the joiners. The pressure on the silent in the middle to choose sides intensifies, up to the point where it is virtually impossible to retain a middle position. People are driven to one side or the other in the polarization process. The middle ground is no longer an option. Neutrality is no longer possible. This is a starting point for civil war and atrocity. At this point, a target for all the frustration and hatred is sought. Here we come across the fifth role: the scapegoat. Often, it is the bridge builder who turns into the scapegoat. He had been suspect all along, since he refused to take sides, but did, however, mingle in the discussion. Now *he* becomes the target. In Rwanda this was seen when the plane with the politicians came down. The next morning, a Rwandese Hutu radio station indicted the Tutsi revolutionary army as the perpetrator, using the term 'cockroach' (Brummel, 2004). In a matter of days, polarization maximized: you either belonged to the Hutu or the Tutsi camp. There was no neutral position possible anymore. Since the Tutsi's were a clear minority on account of numbers alone, it were the moderate Hutu's, the ones who had tried to keep the middle position, who were among the first victims during the killings in Kigali (Brummel, 2004). They became the scapegoat.

The genocide in Rwanda caught many outside the African continent off-guard. Many of us did not see it coming. It was the gruesome tip of the iceberg. Polarization as a process can, indeed, be compared to an iceberg: most of its development takes place under the water-line of a society, on grass-roots level of a community. In understanding the course a society is taking, it is important to be in contact on grass-roots level with the middle ground of society. This is an important insight for journalists and for the self-understanding of the journalistic profession. In media and journalism, the attention is all too often on the visible and the extreme: the conflict and the poles. But in a situation of polarization the two sides focused on do not necessarily reflect society; the poles propagate adversary, based on constructed identities. They serve themselves first and foremost. By focusing attention on these poles, media and Journalism provide a stage for the propagation of adversary in society, often missing out on the experience of people in the middle, on grass-roots level.

In his doctoral dissertation, Theogene Bangwanubusa compares two neighboring communes in Rwanda, Giti and Murambi (Bangwanubusa, 2009).

Murambi fell prey to the polarizing process and partook in the genocide; Giti resisted. The question why genocide occurred in one commune and was resisted in another is obviously not an easy one to answer. Bangwanubusa, therefore, emphasizes that there are many factors involved and in his careful wording we find the attempt to do justice to what happened and to all who are affected. In conclusion of his extensive research, Bangwanubusa points to presence (or absence) of a working civil society as the crucial aspect that made the difference between violence and safety. In Giti, the empirical material of the research showed a civil society where people were aware of their history and identity and experienced an interconnectedness within the community. This interconnectedness was furthered by and reflected in different levels of communal and religious leadership. It was this communal interconnectedness that failed in Murambi (Bangwanubusa, 2009: 232f).

The role of journalism is to provide information, clarification and interpretation on matters of general concern. It stands in the service of society and is indispensable as a safeguard for the independence and freedom of the people. Yet, we have seen how journalism and media often provide fuel for polarization and division in society. How can this destructive impact be turned around? Brandsma's polarization model discusses four game changers that can provide new insight for a more constructive form of Journalism.

Game changers

Media often focuses on the poles in polarization. That is where the action takes place and where the opinions are most explicit. The impact of polarization is mostly felt in the middle ground. It is there that people experience polarization in daily life and are put under pressure. The first game changer for anyone who wants to contribute to depolarization focuses on **change of target group** of attention: away from the poles, towards the silent in the middle. That means: creating a diverse network, getting to know all kinds of people that live, move and have their being in that middle ground.

The second game changer focuses on a **changing of subject**. The first law stated that polarization objectifies identity. Identity is the key subject that divides the groups. So, in order to turn the polarization dynamic around, one needs to find the subject that connects the groups. In the case of Rwanda, the underlying problem was the access (or lack of it) to resources and political power. The colonial powers had favored the Tutsi's above the Hutu's, giving them access to political power. This had produced hardships and emotional responses. So, here the subject of the debate should no longer be whether the Tutsi's really were the usurpers and collaborators with the colonialists or the Hutu's the backward

brutes, but rather how to arrive at a fair and equitable sharing of resources and political powers?

The third game changer focuses on a **change of position**. As the focus of attention in the polarization process goes out to the poles, so does the focus of attention of many a bridge builder and peace keeper. More often than not, attempts at appeasement are made from a standpoint over and above the opposing parties. The idea being that the position over and above is a position of neutrality, objectivity and fairness. But we have already seen that this is a tricky position; the bridge builder is maneuvering on very thin ice and his best intentions often produce an intensifying of polarization. Meanwhile, the people most under pressure from the polarization process, the group of the silent, are not affected by the peacekeeping attempts. In the period leading up to the Rwandan genocide, peacekeeping attempts had also been made; President Habyarimana, under pressure from his international allies, signed a peace treaty that entailed a sharing of power with Tutsi's. But reinforcing this from above had no real impact on the emotions on grass-roots level. The UN sent a small peace keeping force to Rwanda, but without a real mandate. The attempts of peacekeeping and bridge building remained hovering over the impending catastrophe and never made a difference on grass-roots level to the people involved. It never reached them. The change of position is a change from 'above' to 'in the middle'; in the middle of the debate, amongst the people, there where it matters. For journalists, this is a particularly important notion and change of how to work. It requires networking in the community, being sensitive to nuances, identifying a red line through many individual stories. More often, however, journalists tend to go with the prepped and structured outlines of the official spokesperson.

The last game changer focuses on the **change of tone**. If you want to depolarize, do not moralize (Brandsma, 2016, p.89). This means talking *with* people, not to them, and it requires having sincere interest, acknowledging people in their life-situations, and being able to suspend your own judgment. These are matters of subtlety and nuance, and it is imperative, as a journalist, to develop these dispositions. People will sense the sincerity of your dispositions and it will make all the difference in whether or not they will open up to you. This also requires reflecting on your own positions in life, relating on a very personal level to the people and topics you cover. Having taught prospective journalists for more than twelve years, it is my firm opinion that the aspects of self-reflection and philosophy-of-life have been underrated in their education. If there would be more substantial and structural attention for these aspects, I believe, prospective journalists would be better equipped and capable of working more constructively.

Four years ago, Dutch philosopher and publicist Rob Wijnberg launched the online journalistic platform *De Correspondent*. Therein, the role of the journalist is transformed, away from the traditional one: in the assumption that journalism's role is to provide information, clarification and interpretation on matters of general concern, the journalist is taken to be the expert on what the matters of general concern are. The journalist is assumed to know what 'real news' is. His/her coverage has the goal of explaining the world and informing people about what is going on around them. However, if we look at the big shifts that have happened in the world recently, like the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, Brexit, the financial crisis of 2008, but definitely also the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the question afterwards has always been: 'what happened and how did this happen?' Many journalist also asked: 'how did we NOT see this coming? What have we missed here?' According to Wijnberg, journalism has failed to look at structural daily changes in society on grass-roots level, but has only looked for the exceptions to that change, focusing on exceptional events, things NOT happening every day (International Journalism Festival, 2017). In Rwanda, the every-day signs of change were there, but, being 'just every-day' events, they were not picked up for what they really were: the indicators of the upcoming genocide. If they had been perceived as such, the catastrophe might have been averted.

The concept of *De Correspondent* is community-based journalism where journalists cooperate with readers in uncovering the deep-seated change in society. Very practically, this means the journalist starts his work with a call-out to the readers, asking them what they know about or have experienced with a particular subject. The question to the readers – 'what do you know and what can you share with me?' - invites people to come forward with *their* stories, to be heard and be involved. The news is about what truly concerns *them*. The different stories put together add insight in what is really happening. This way, journalism does not focus on what went wrong today in which far away part of the world, leaving readers often puzzled and frustrated ('what is *wrong* with these people, what is *wrong* with that continent?!'), but rather explains more comprehensively how the world, on the basis of grass-roots level experiences, works. Explaining how their world works helps readers to see how they can *live* in this world, help solve the problems of this world, and how they can make changes to improve it. That way, journalism can become a more constructive force in society.

Rwandese journalist and genocide survivor Thomas Kalindi was asked by fellow journalists how they could know whether they were doing the right thing. His answer: "[L]ook at what you write. Listen to what you say and analyze

yourself. If you are demonizing people, if you are stigmatizing other tribes, other clans, you're involved in violence" (Kalindi, 2007).

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